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HE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE of intellec-
tual property has been rising spectacularly 
over the past decades, as its value is increas-
ing as a share of average total firm value. The num-
ber of patent applications is growing at double-digit 
rates in the major patent offices, and licensing and 
cross-licensing are being employed with greater  
frequency than ever before, particularly in high-
technology industries. The increased intensity of 
innovation characterising the knowledge-based 
economy and the increase in the propensity to patent 
(that is, the increase in the ratio of number of patents 
to number of innovations or number of patents per 
real R&D spending) that is indicative of the emer-
gence of new research and innovation management 
techniques are the main factors contributing to this 
quantitative evolution. 
Although patents and other intellectual property 
rights (IPR) are becoming of great importance to 
support innovation and economic growth, their im-
pact on economic performance is extremely unbal-
anced and uneven in different countries and national 
systems of innovation. In this article, we reiterate 
that this impact is very weak in Europe and that 
there is, therefore, significant room for policy action 
to create a better system of IPR, which constitutes 
one of the key institutions in systems of innovation. 
After briefly examining the US challenge and the 
international and European dimensions of patent 
regulations, this paper devotes special attention to 
the short-term and long-term issues facing the Euro-
pean patent system. The concluding remarks reflect 
on the problems and possible solutions identified in 
the article and discuss the role of the patent system 
for the dynamics of innovation in Europe. 
T
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US challenge 
Table 1 provides information concerning the patent 
propensity rates for large European and American 
firms, as a proxy of patent rates for Europe and 
America (that is, of all patentable innovations, the 
number actually patented). It indicates that European 
firms patent less than American ones. The reasons 
for such a weak propensity to patent in Europe are 
clearly identified thanks to the Community Innova-
tion Survey (CIS): the main reasons in the case of 
large firms are that patents are not considered to be 
particularly effective for preventing imitation, and 
the patent application process itself may provide too 
much information to rivals. These two reasons are 
cited by approximately 60% of CIS respondents that 
chose not to patent an innovation, compared to 26% 
citing application cost and 13% defence costs as the 
principal reason (MERIT, 2000). 
At the same time, American companies are devel-
oping aggressive patent strategies in the USA and 
Europe, by means of patent extension to the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO), while the American legal 
framework has been greatly upgraded. The creation 
of intellectual property becomes a central objective 
in the global strategy of large American firms. 
For a long time, the approach to intellectual prop-
erty was that patents were for defensive purposes 
only; patents and related know-how ought not to be 
sold. Licensing represented a drain on internal re-
sources. Patents are now regarded as unique means 
by which to generate value from intangible assets, 
and companies are starting to exploit this through 
aggressive licensing programmes. Thus, Arora et al 
(1999) note with regard to DuPont, “Reversing its 
tradition of treating in-house technology as the jewel 
of the crown, DuPont has started to exploit it 
through an aggressive licensing program”. 
With the current (or expected) strengthening of 
national and international legal systems of intellec-
tual property, the expected benefits of amassing 
portfolios of legal rights began to outweigh their 
costs. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) explain the patent 
paradox in the semiconductor industry, that is, the 
gap between the relative effectiveness of patents and 
their widespread use, with the fact that large compa-
nies amass vast patent portfolios simply as “bargain-
ing chips” to allow them to sort out conflicting and 
overlapping claims to intellectual property. 
The other complementary evolution in the USA is 
changes in patenting policy as it is implemented by 
the patent office. This includes: the expansion of 
patentable subject matter to include software, busi-
ness methods and gene fragments; an apparent re-
duction of the size of inventive step required 
(especially in some of the new subject matter areas); 
inadequate prior art search,1 again especially in new 
subject matter areas; and excessive claims breadth. 
The main aspect of changes covering all these 
evolutions is that patent offices have completely sur-
rendered their regulatory role. Until the 1970s, the 
general view held by them was that patents were 
anti-competitive and detrimental for the economy. 
Patent offices were predominantly regarded as  
‘rejection offices’ rather than as institutions for sup-
porting innovators. They therefore played a signifi-
cant regulatory role, blocking or slowing down 
private appropriation in certain fields. For example, 
the patentability criteria of ‘industrial application’ 
(utility) were very effective in the USA in blocking 
the patenting of the first genetic inventions in the 
late 1980s. 
For several reasons, patent offices have become 
extremely pro-patent since the early 1980s. The new 
view is that innovation must be assisted and foreign 
investors attracted. The applicant, formerly consid-
ered with suspicion, has become a ‘client’, whose 
needs must be satisfied by quick, cheap procedures. 
The result is a total deterioration of examination 
procedures, as the office’s role is confined to that of 
a registry office and a statistics bureau. 
Thus, the pendulum started swinging away from 
rigorous examination towards expediency, both in 
terms of time and money. Nowadays, patentability 
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Table 1. Patent propensity in Europe and the USA 
 Product  
innovations (%) 
Process  
innovations (%) 
Europe 44 26 
United States 52 44 
Source: MERIT (2000) 
US patent offices have become 
extremely pro-patent since the early 
1980s: innovation must be assisted and 
foreign investors attracted, with a 
resulting deterioration of examination 
procedures, as the office is confined to 
a registry office and statistics bureau 
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criteria have ceased to play their role of preserving 
the public domain; the criteria have gradually been 
eased and extended to new subject domains. Many 
research results have now become patentable as a 
result of both legal (court) and patent office deci-
sions. The increasing opportunity to patent funda-
mental knowledge, research tools and databases is 
part and parcel of a broader movement towards 
strengthening IPRs. 
The third evolution deals with the transformation 
of the US legal system. This involved the creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It was 
established to unify the basis of interpretation and 
enhance firms’ confidence by reducing legal uncer-
tainty (Jaffe, 2000). A range of other factors in the 
institutional environment in the USA is reinforcing 
this trend in favour of the applicant, for example, the 
evolution of the judicial institution and jurispru-
dence, which are increasingly favourable towards 
the patent holder as opposed to a party suspected of 
infringement. In the USA, where only 62% of hold-
ers of valid patents won their appeal case before 
1980, this figure has risen to 90% (Jaffe, 2000). 
These results ought to incite us to turn to the na-
ture of the patent system in Europe as well as of the 
legal framework providing the necessary tools to 
enforce property rights. 
Policy issues at nationally and internationally 
At the national level, the benefits and costs of 
stronger intellectual property (IP) protection are at 
least conceptually simple: stronger IP rights provide 
stronger incentives for innovators and increase the 
potential for local (within country) spillovers from 
R&D. The costs are higher prices because of the 
monopoly power thus created and an increase in the 
cost of follow-on innovation, which may reduce lo-
cal R&D by increasing transaction and other costs of 
acquiring prior knowledge. Choosing an optimal 
national policy depends on weighing these costs and 
benefits (Hall, 2001). 
As is explained well by Hall (2001), the implica-
tions of national policies at international level are 
more difficult to analyse. One problem arises because 
the very externalities leading a country to adopt IP 
protection policy mean that the effects of the policy 
do not stop at the national border, nor are countries 
immune from repercussions from the policies of 
other countries. A country with a strong IP policy 
has increased the global incentives for innovation 
and the potential for spillovers, while at the same 
time reducing the relative incentive for innovative 
activity elsewhere, both by attracting R&D to move 
within its borders and by raising the cost of follow-
on invention elsewhere. 
Of course, the actual size of these cross-border ef-
fects varies enormously with a country’s size, capa-
city for innovation and R&D, education levels, trade 
position and even commercial language. Countries 
where business is conducted in English are privileged 
because of the prominence of that language in inter-
national patenting and scientific publication. Such 
factors mean that countries such as the USA will be 
less impacted by developments elsewhere than will 
smaller economies. The optimal national policy that 
takes account of international consideration may 
therefore be quite different in different countries. 
Nevertheless, the collective view expressed in the 
TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights) agreement is that harmonisation in intellectual 
property protection is desirable. 
However, we should make a critical note of the 
tendency of harmonisation to raise the level of pro-
tection. Once a property right has been granted, it is 
extremely difficult to subsequently take it away, 
which means it is far easier politically to strengthen 
IPR in countries where it is weak than to weaken it 
in countries where it is strong. 
Short-term policy issues 
A strong patent system is characterised by a high 
degree of confidence of agents in this way to gain 
protection from imitators. The conditions rendering 
a patent system ‘strong’ concern enforcement, 
minimum level of legal uncertainty, minimal prob-
ability of litigation, and low application costs. This 
means that the system, as it stands in Europe and 
beyond at present, is not ‘strong’ at all; it is weak. 
Reinforcing the protection of intellectual property, 
which is a matter of institutional and legal adjust-
ments (in the sense of unifying patent doctrine to 
minimise ambiguities and uncertainties in patent 
suits or reduce the cost of patent application or im-
prove enforcement conditions), is, thus, a priority at 
both the European and international levels. 
At the global economic level, the TRIPS agree-
ments oblige all World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
members to establish a minimum level of legislation 
in favour of intellectual property rights; however, 
the costs of upgrading the intellectual property sys-
tem and increasing its quality (including, for in-
stance, the training of patent personnel and the 
improvement of facilities in the intellectual property 
administration) are so high that a transition period 
has been organised for many developing countries. 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) and its 
patent office ensure that the procedures for applying 
for, and granting, patents in Europe are the same 
throughout its 27 member countries. This provides 
considerable procedural harmonisation among Euro-
pean countries; however, these rights must be de-
fended in each individual country. The ensuing high 
levels of legal uncertainty thus render the current 
European patent system ‘weak’. Furthermore, filing 
a patent in Europe is a costly activity (actually more 
costly than in the USA or Japan). Table 2 presents a 
comparison of costs and fees, in Euros, for the three 
big patent systems. 
Intellectual property rights Table 2. Patent systems costs and fees in Euros 
 Filing/ 
search fees 
Examination 
fees 
Grant fees Renewal fees Translation 
costs 
Agent fees Total 
EPC 810 + 532 1431 715 16790 17000 12600 49900 
USA 690 – 1210 2730 na 5700 10330 
Japan 210 1100 850 5840 na 8450 16450 
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It is important to note the right hand column, 
which indicates the comparison between the overall 
costs involved in the current European system, the 
USA and Japan. It shows that the average cost of 
obtaining a European patent is considerably higher 
than in the case of our competitors. We can see that 
translation costs and renewal fees are highly signifi-
cant factors in the difference among the systems. 
As regards translation costs, there are broad  
differences among the three scenarios evaluated: 
• Complete translation of the patent document into 
the ten official languages: 17,000 
• Translation of the patent document into the three 
working languages of the Office: 5100 
• Translation of the patent document into one of the 
Office’s three working languages and of the 
claims into the other two: 2200 
Efforts to create a true ‘European Community’ patent 
that could be enforced uniformly in the 25 countries 
were relaunched in the late 1990s; however, in spite 
of these efforts and widespread demand for such an 
instrument from European business, a final decision 
has not been reached at the time of writing. There 
are two primary political problems associated with 
the creation of a Community patent: the adjustment 
of national court systems in Member States; and the 
language regime. In 2003, progress was made to-
wards reaching a ‘common position’ at the minis-
terial level, agreeing to a single, specialised 
Community Court and to establish a linguistic re-
gime capable of maintaining translation costs at a 
minimum. 
Long-term policy issues 
From 1836 to 1950, there were just under 2.5 million 
patents issued in the USA. In 1999 alone, the 
USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office) received 
270,000 applications and issued more than 150,000 
patents, one of which bore number 6,000,000 (Poo-
ley, 2002). In 2000, the number of applications 
reached 300,000 for the first time. Over the past ten 
years, American patent applications and patent 
grants have thus both increased at a rate of about 6% 
per annum, compared to about 1% per annum in the 
preceding 40 years. 
In Europe, similar effects are observed, with EPO 
applications rising at an annual rate of 10% per  
annum over the past five years. Interestingly, the 
response of the EPO, unlike the USPTO, has been to 
maintain a steady grant rate, meaning that the appli-
cation–grant lag has risen (see Figures 1 and 2). 
A series of problems appear to emerge in the long 
term. 
Increasing transactions costs This view entails a 
large set of implications involving various phenom-
ena that can be grouped, for the sake of convenience, 
under the heading “transaction cost increases”. Both 
qualitative trends (increasing fragility of patents) 
and quantitative changes (increase in the number of 
patent applications and grants) are likely to increase 
transaction costs. 
Efforts and costs devoted to sorting out conflict-
ing and overlapping claims to IPR will increase, as 
will uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of 
legal liability in using knowledge inputs. Again,  
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Figure 1. US Patent and Trademark Office utility patents 1965–2000 
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policy makers and academics are concerned with 
increasing litigation costs, including indirect costs, 
which may distort the innovative behaviour of small 
companies. As John Barton (2000) put it, there is a 
problem when “the number of intellectual property 
lawyers is growing faster than the number of re-
searchers”. This is exactly what has happened in the 
USA, while similar trends in Europe show that it is 
no longer a purely American problem. 
This problem is not new, of course, as the follow-
ing comment by a concerned industrialist in 1865 
shows:2 
“In the manufacture with which I am connected 
— the sugar trade — there are somewhere like 
300 or 400 patents. Now, how are we to know 
all these 400 patents? How are we to manage 
continually, in the natural process of making 
improvements in manufacture, to know which 
of these patents we are at any time conflicting 
with? So far as I know, we are not violating any 
patent; but really, if we are to be exceedingly 
earnest in the question, probably we would re-
quire to have a highly paid clerk in London 
continually analysing the various patents; and 
every year, by the multiplication of patents, this 
difficulty is becoming more formidable.” 
We can, however, consider that the extent of the 
problem has grown substantially in recent years. 
Blockage and anticommons trap The following 
two cases are particularly indicative of the problem 
of anticommons (a risk of underuse of resources) as 
it might occur in the knowledge economy (Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998). 
The first blockage results from the fact that 
knowledge is fragmented and rights are granted to 
portions of knowledge before the corresponding 
product is identified, whereas previously it was the 
genes corresponding to products that were patented, 
for instance, therapeutic proteins, diagnostic tests. 
The proliferation of patents on fragments of genes 
owned by different agents hugely complicates the 
co-ordination required by an agent interested in  
developing a product. In particular, if the acquisition 
of all necessary licences is too complicated or ex-
pensive, the product will never materialise. 
A second blockage results from procedures 
known as ‘reachthrough licence agreements’, which 
provide the patent holder with rights over future dis-
coveries. These rights may consist of the payment of 
royalties on sales, of licences on future discoveries, 
or of a priority option for obtaining licences. The 
system was initially designed to enable researchers 
with limited financial resources to use a patented 
discovery and to pay only if the research produced 
results. 
In the end, however, this kind of system gives the 
owners of first patents the right to be present at all 
stages of subsequent developments, even if they did 
not contribute to them. Once again, there is a risk of 
under-utilisation of certain discoveries because of 
situations in which the rights of those concerned be-
come entangled. 
Certain situations in the domain of information 
technology also pose this type of problem. 
Is the anticommons regime described a transition, 
or does it signal a tragedy? Theoretically, we can 
hope for the creation of appropriate institutions to 
help agents co-ordinate the trading of licences. Also 
theoretically, collective learning can lead to real de-
creases in transaction costs. In practice, however, it 
is difficult to see how mechanisms of natural correc-
tion could appear and put an end to these deadlock 
situations. 
There is a huge degree of heterogeneity among 
actors, and transaction costs are enormous for those 
wanting to group together rights in order to recom-
pose fragmented knowledge. Even worse, cognitive 
biases cause everyone to overestimate the probabil-
ity of their own patent being a miracle patent, which 
leads everyone to want more than the probable value 
of the asset in question (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998). 
Privatisation of science All studies indicate that 
the evolution towards the privatisation of science 
represents a real risk of an irremediable alteration of 
modes of co-operation and sharing of knowledge in 
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Figure 2. European Patent Office and EPO/PCT (Patent Co-operation 
Treaty) patents 1978–1999 
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the domain of basic research. Restricted access to 
knowledge and the retention of knowledge produced 
by universities comes in several forms, for instance, 
delayed or partial publication and communication, 
secrecy, and patents. The exclusive licence is a sig-
nificant form, that is, new knowledge is sold exclu-
sively to one firm. When there is nothing left but 
exclusive bilateral contracts between university 
laboratories and firms, we have forms of quasi-
integration, which undermine the domain of open 
knowledge. 
Mowery et al (1999) study the impact of Am-
erican laws authorising universities to grant exclu-
sive licences on the results of research financed by 
public funds, especially the Bayh-Dole Act. These 
laws aim to solve the problem of ‘post-invention’ 
costs and risks in taking a new invention out of the 
laboratory and developing it into a successful  
commercial product. Firms would be unwilling to 
support these costs without some assurance of  
protection from competition. Patents and exclusive 
licensing thus facilitate the transfer of new technol-
ogy to the private sector by providing exclusive 
rights to preserve the profit incentives of innovating 
firms. 
However, by only focusing on exclusive licens-
ing, these laws are based on a narrow view of the 
channels through which public research interacts 
with industry. In reality, these channels are multiple 
(publication, conferences, consultancy, training,  
expertise) and all contribute to the transfer of  
knowledge, while the incentives created by such  
legislation only promote one channel (patenting and 
licences), at the risk of blocking the others. The au-
thors’ conclusion is unambiguous (Mowery et al, 
1998, page 29): 
“The Bayh-Dole Act and the related activities 
of US universities in seeking out industrial 
funding for collaborative R&D have consider-
able potential to increase the ‘excludability’ of 
academic research results and to reduce the 
‘knowledge distribution’ capabilities of univer-
sity research.” 
Institutional diversity in danger Threats against the 
diversity of institutional arrangements are a cause 
for concern. Traditionally, IPRs are considered to be 
one of the incentive structures society employs to 
encourage innovative effort. They co-exist with 
other incentive structures, each of which has costs 
and benefits as well as a degree of complementarity. 
The new view is that IPRs are the only means  
by which to commodify the intangible capital rep-
resented by knowledge. They should therefore serve 
as a common currency or ‘yardstick’ for measuring 
the output of activities devoted to knowledge 
generation and the basis for markets in knowledge 
exchange. 
In a recent book (Foray, 2004), I analysed such 
diversity as being important on the grounds that each 
institution fulfils specific functions, and strong  
complementarities exist between them; however,  
the space for public research (procurement and pat-
ronage) is shrinking, and functions that were as-
sumed by open science are no longer assumed at  
the same level. This is a problem, not only for the 
survival of open science per se, but also for the sus-
tainability of the patent system as a whole. Exces-
sive privatisation may undermine the long-term 
interests of industry itself, which will benefit from 
less public knowledge, less training and screening 
externalities. 
Finally, the scenario of a pure functional substitu-
tion (the private sector would simply carry out the 
functions that were formerly assumed by the public 
sector) is incorrect. We know that private companies 
will never fund the same type of basic research that 
the public sector abandons. Similarly, market-based 
institutions could satisfy the need for scientific train-
ing only very partially. 
As argued by Cohen et al (1998), there are several 
reasons why spillovers from the downstream R&D 
conducted by firms engaged in basic research is not 
likely to entirely replace the information flows that 
were initially blocked. First, firms will attempt to 
restrict spillovers to retain proprietary advantage. 
Second, there will typically be considerable lags be-
tween the time when the firm receives the valuable 
information and the time when information spills 
over to other firms. Economic studies on the US 
model reveal a degree of concern. One of the con-
clusions presented by Cockburn and Henderson 
(1997, page 30) is that: 
“policies which weaken these institutions (of 
open science), make public sector researchers 
more market-oriented, or redistribute rents 
through efforts to increase the appropriability 
of public research through restrictions in the 
ways in which public and private sectors work 
with each other, may therefore be counter-
productive in the long run.” 
This is a strong conclusion that prompts us to  
examine this new model carefully without being 
blinded by the brilliance of its undeniable short-term 
performance. 
All studies indicate that the evolution 
towards the privatisation of science 
represents a real risk of an 
irremediable alteration of modes of  
co-operation and sharing of knowledge 
in the domain of basic research 
Intellectual property rights 
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Solving the long-term problems 
The issue is certainly not to abolish the patent sys-
tem; rather, it is to make corrections and improve-
ments at the margin capable of bringing about a 
certain equilibrium in some instances and securing 
enduring and dynamic innovation processes. We can 
list three classes of solutions to the various problems 
developed below. 
Facilitate access to private knowledge 
Mechanisms are devised to support the rapid  
dissemination and free exploitation of private 
knowledge in certain circumstances or for certain 
classes of economic agents. There are three main 
mechanisms: 
• Compulsory licensing (compulsory diffusion of 
private knowledge in the general interest): while 
the very idea of a compulsory licence was viewed 
as an insult to the notion of property (since a basic 
right — that of not selling — is alienated), this 
practice is tending to take over and to spread to 
unexceptional circumstances. While most com-
pulsory licences are applied for in the general in-
terest (consider the struggle between South Africa 
and the major pharmaceutical multinationals), it 
tends to become a last resort in the field of 
competition policy when the refusal to grant a 
licence can be interpreted as abuse of a dominant 
position. 
• Patent buyout: the state or an international foun-
dation purchasing patents to return them to the 
public domain. The historical case traditionally 
drawn on to illustrate this mechanism is that of 
Daguerre, the inventor of photography, who nei-
ther exploited his invention nor sold it for the 
price he wanted. In 1839, the French Government 
purchased the patent and put the rights to  
Daguerre’s invention in the public domain. The 
invention was developed very quickly! 
• Price discrimination: Ramsey’s pricing rule sug-
gests price discrimination between users whose 
demands are inelastic and those for whom the 
quantity purchased is extremely price-sensitive. 
The former category of buyer will therefore bear 
high prices without curtailing the quantity of 
goods purchased, whereas the low prices offered 
to those in the second category, for instance, 
scholars and university-based researchers, will 
spare them the burden of economic welfare reduc-
ing cutbacks in their use of the good. The clause 
of fair use for research or educational purposes is 
an interpretation of this rule. 
The well-known problem involved in compulsory 
licensing and patent-buyout schemes has to do with 
the valuation of the invention and the likelihood of 
burdensome legal and administrative expenses that 
makes these schemes second-best solutions. 
Navigating the patent thicket. 
Cross-licensing mechanisms offer a classical solu-
tion to the anticommons trap. Processes of learning 
about the trading of rights and systems of mutual 
concession can occur, for instance, within a consor-
tium. This may keep transaction costs at tolerable 
levels and thus favour the regulation of the anti-
common regime to a certain extent; however, it is a 
solution that can work only with a limited number of 
companies. In that respect, the rapid growth of new 
kinds of firms does caution against overconfidence 
in relation to overcoming anticommons problems. 
For example, the computer hardware industry had 
few problems with its cross-licensing arrangements 
until new kinds of semiconductor companies 
emerged. 
Actions directed at patent office practices 
If patent requirements are to be strictly enforced, a 
great deal of action must be taken as regards the  
patent office (utility requirement, non-obviousness, 
patent scope). Policy-makers ought to launch pro-
grammes to convince patent officers of the critical 
need to create initial endowments of property rights 
that are more coherent in so far as they respect the 
indivisibility of goods (avoiding the anticommons 
trap). 
We should note, however, that hybrid and com-
plex objects, for instance, genes, DNA sequences, 
software and databases, generate numerous uncer-
tainties about the appropriate intellectual property 
policy related to them, rendering the tasks of patent 
offices very difficult. It is difficult to provide unam-
biguous, clear answers to the question of whether 
these new objects should be privately appropriated 
and, if so, what class of IPR should be used. We are 
now living in a period in which these new objects 
are being put to the test. 
Under this kind of circumstance of great un-
certainty, it might be useful to think about the  
creation of new categories of intellectual prop- 
erty, such as the ‘common good’ — a category  
that would match those situations in which ‘we  
don’t know’, that is, society requires time to con-
sider the legal status of the new object while  
the economy requires some measure of legal cer-
tainty to proceed with R&D investments. In this re-
spect, lawyers think that certain new complex and 
hybrid objects, such as genes, do not fit in the usual 
categories of private–public goods. Instead, they 
propose to work on a new category: the common 
good. 
Under a common good regime, innovation defies 
patrimonial and commercial appropriation. The pri-
vate company that is in possession of it for industrial 
exploitation is not the owner of the good; rather, it 
serves as a sort of manager. Such a regime would 
allow for the emergence of an industry while avoid-
ing private and exclusive rights. 
Intellectual property rights 
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Beyond intellectual property 
In contexts in which reliance on such mitigating  
devices is not feasible or not very effective, the al-
ternative mechanisms for solving the public good 
problem based on public property may be superior to 
intellectual property rights as a means of stimulating 
innovation. 
Concluding remarks 
The intellectual property institution is in flux. It is 
shifting away from a patent system preserving the 
right of the inventor to ‘say no’ (to refuse access and 
to keep the knowledge unexploited) to a system 
promoting the right of systematic access while pre-
serving a right for the inventor to be remunerated. 
The increasing importance in policy discussions 
concerning compulsory licensing (beginning to be 
used not only in areas of public health and security, 
but also for competition policy reasons), the new 
policy interest in price discrimination schemes, and 
the abundant literature on various ways to obtain a 
‘freedom to operate’ by bypassing or ignoring intel-
lectual property, signal just such an evolution. 
How far can the system go, and to what extent can 
the provision of this kind of tool assist in the solu-
tion of problems of knowledge access? Are these 
mechanisms sufficiently strong and enforced in do-
mains where ‘essential human rights’ are at stake 
(health, education, food)? Is, for instance, a system 
of compulsory licensing the solution to the problem 
raised by the broad patents covering diagnostic tests 
for breast cancer, as well as other similar problems 
in the healthcare and pharmaceutical areas? 
In such a changing institutional context, the Euro-
pean challenge is twofold as regards adapting and 
transforming its patent system. 
• Creating a more effective system is the first chal-
lenge. This ought to be brought about through the 
creation of a true European Community patent 
that supports common procedures for applying 
and granting patents, as well as enforcing property 
rights by significantly lowering the levels of legal 
uncertainty and costs. 
• Learning from American experiments (and per-
haps mistakes) is the second challenge. This in-
volves setting a different trajectory regarding 
institution design as related to innovation and 
knowledge creation and distribution. Indeed, there 
are some doubts as to the fact whether, in the age 
of the knowledge economy, the new equilibrium 
established in the USA (with intensive patenting 
activities, large amounts of cross-licensing,  
aggressive patent enforcement strategies and  
privatisation of some basic research activities) is 
better than the preceding one, which was charac-
terised by a moderate level of patenting activities, 
firms allowing diffusion of their own knowledge 
in return for low cost absorption of other’s knowl-
edge, and a large public research domain. The lat-
ter appears to be a system with lower transaction 
costs, while the former does not seem distinctly 
superior in terms of knowledge production. The 
extent to which Europe can achieve the latter 
equilibrium without hampering its competitive 
position remains an open question. 
Notes 
1. Prior art search is looking for antecedents of the innovation. 
2. Macfie, R A, quoted in George W Hastings (editor) (1865), 
“Is the granting of patents for inventions conducive to the in-
terests of trade?”, Transactions of the National Association 
for the Promotion of Social Science, pages 661–665. Thanks 
to Bronwyn Hall for drawing my attention to this quotation. 
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